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FORMAL AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACHES TO
SEPARATION-OF-POWERS QUESTIONS-A
FOOLISH INCONSISTENCY?
Peter L. Strausst
Is it possible to give contemporary shape to the principles of
constitutional structure we know as "separation of powers"? That
question was sharply presented once again on the final day of the
Supreme Court's most recent Term, when it decided two cases raising separation-of-powers issues. In Bowsher v. Synar, I the subject of
this symposium, the Court found constitutional fault in Congress's
asserted expansion of its own powers at the expense of the President's article II authority. Commodity Future Trading Commission v.
Schor, 2 far less widely noted, upheld against constitutional challenge
Congress's assignment to an administrative adjudicator of the
power to resolve a counterclaim arising under state common law,
that might have been thought to require disposition by an article III
court. The basic problem facing the Court in each case was accommodating the enormously complex and varied structure of the federal government, as it has grown over the years, to the
Constitution's provisions for distributing the power of government
among three named heads of authority, each of which in contemplation performs a unique function. In this sense at least, the cases ask
the same constitutional question: how should the judiciary assess
Congress's exercise of its general authority to provide such structure for the affairs of government as it deems "necessary and
proper" in light of the Constitution's clear statement that "all legislative powers herein granted" are vested in "Congress," "the executive power" is vested in the "President," and "the judicial power" is
vested in the "Supreme Court" and any lower courts Congress
3
chooses to establish?
Bowsher and Schor each reached defensible results, yet (wholly
apart from the analytic difficulties each opinion may present on its
t
Betts Professor of Law, Columbia University School of Law. This article has benefited greatly from conversations with Bruce Ackerman, Harold Bruff, Steven Carter,
Geoffrey Miller, Henry Monaghan, Andrzej Rapaczynski, Susan Rose-Ackerman, Roy

Schotland, and Cass Sunstein. For most parenthetical characterizations of cases and
other citations in these footnotes, the author thanks the editors of the CornellLaw Review.
1 106 S. Ct. 3181 (1986).
2 106 S. Ct. 3245 (1986).
3
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1, art. II, § 1, art. III, § 1.
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own terms) they exemplified inconsistent reasoning styles. The
Supreme Court has vacillated over the years between using a formalistic approach to separation-of-powers issues grounded in the
perceived necessity of maintaining three distinct branches of government (and consequently appearing to draw rather sharp boundaries), 4 and a functional approach that stresses core function and
relationship, and permits a good deal of flexibility when these attributes are not threatened.5 In Bowsher, seven Justices relied on formalism in rejecting Congress's work, over the vigorous protests of
two dissenting functionalists. In Schor, seven functionalists-the
Bowsher dissenters plus five of the majority in that case-sustained
Congress's choice over a formalist dissent. Five Justices, then, apparently wanted to have it both ways.
Although the Court has been unsettled how these knotty questions of structure should be resolved (a question that consumes the
bulk of the remaining pages), in the past decade it has not been
hesitant to act. On the eve of the Constitution's bicentennial the
Court has unhinged major federal statutes on three separate occasions-apparently without provoking either alarm or a sense of constitutional crisis. In one case, the Court held that the Bankruptcy
Reform Act's broad grant ofjurisdiction to the nation's bankruptcy
courts violated article 111.6 In another, the Court put in question
almost 200 statutes for their inclusion of a "legislative veto." 7 Finally, in Bowsher, the Court rejected Congress's effort to discipline
itself from adding to the burgeoning national debt. That judicial
frustration of Congress's choices on so wide and important a range
of national problems should be (as appears) so easily accepted is
8
itself remarkable.
The Court's apparent willingness to act has now given rise in
4 E.g., Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 944-51 (1983);
Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 64-66 (1982);
Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 629-30 (1935); Myers v. United States,
272 U.S. 52, 116-17 (1926).
5 E.g., United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 713 (1974); Nixon v. Administrator of
General Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 442-43 (1977). On the general proposition, see Bruff, On
the ConstitutionalStatus of the Administrative Agencies, 36 AM. U.L. REV. 491 (1987); Strauss,
The Place of Agencies in Government, Separation of Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L.

REV. 573 (1984).
6 Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982).

INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
8 Not so many years ago it was well understood that the Supreme Court did not
really exercise much control over Congress, at least outside the area of individual rights.
The occasions on which the Court actually held federal statutes to be unconstitutional
were few and often intellectually doubtful. When these decisions concerned matters of
national importance, such as the scandal of child labor or the rescue of the national
economy from a terrible depression, political and critical reaction was swift and coruscating, and history's verdict negative.
7
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some quarters to even larger questions. All three cases reflect a revival of concern about constitutional issues touching the structure of
government-that is, the problem of separation of powers-that appears driven by broadly shared fears that the national bureaucracy
(or, more embracively, the national government) has moved beyond
effective control, either by the people or by those whom the people
directly select to head the government for them. Despite each opinion's insistence that its authors intended no such effect, 9 both government' 0 and private attorneys" have attempted to use these cases
to put independent regulatory commissions (bodies previously regarded as well-integrated if not in all respects well-understood arrangements of government) into constitutional shadow.
Any such effect of the recent cases would make the Court's adventurism on separation-of-powers issues even more remarkable.
Both in an early footnote of the Bowsher opinion12 and in Schor, the
Court gave unmistakable notice that the independent regulatory
commissions would in fact be protected, and that nothing it had said
in other contexts about separation of powers should be understood
as impairing Congress's frequent choice of such bodies to carry out
the functions of government. Most of the literature thriving under
the influence of these cases has assumed such an outcome, indeed
struggled for a means of justifying it.' 3 I assume here that, in fact,
Congress's assignment of governmental functions to "independent"
agencies will be sustained. The only possible questions, then, concern the Court's assessment of necessary and permitted controls by
the President, Congress, or courts over the independent agencies'
functioning. As the courts have in fact insisted, they simply will not
assume so destructive a role respecting institutions that often have
worked well in carrying out their assigned tasks, 14 and that occupy
) Bowsher, 106 S. Ct. at 3193; Chadha, 462 U.S. at 931-35; Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S.
at 80.
1o As reflected in Justice White's dissent, the Solicitor General argued in Bowsher
that executive authority could not be vested in any officer who is not removable at will by
the President. Bowsher; 106 S. Ct. at 3206 (White, J., dissenting); see also Taylor, A Question of Power; A Poweiful Questione; N.Y. Times, Nov. 6, 1985, at B8, col. 3.
11
See Ticor Title Ins. Co. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 625 F. Supp. 747, 748 (D.D.C.
1986), ajfld, 814 F.2d 731 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
12
106 S.Ct. at 3188 n.4 (The holding denying congressional participation in removal should cast no doubt on proposition that Congress may "vest... governmental
functions in officers who are free from the partisanship that may be expected of agents
wholly dependent upon the President." (quoting id. at 3207 (White, J., dissenting)).
13 See Bruff, supra note 5; Entin, The Removal-Power and the FederalDeficit: Form, Substance, and Administrative bIdependence, 75 Ky. LJ. - (1987); Miller, Independent Agencies.
1986 Sup. CT. REv. 41; Pierce, The Role of Constitutional and PoliticalTheory in Administrative
Law.64 TEx. L. REV. 469 (1985); Strauss, supra note 5; Strauss & Sunstein, The Role of the
President and OMB in Iformal Ruletakhig, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 181 (1986); Verkuil, The
Status of Independent A.-gencies A4fter Bowsher v. Synar, 1986 DUKE LJ. 779.
14 Years of debate have not demonstrated that single-headed, politically "attached"
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such a large place in government. This paper asks whether the
courts can avoid this destructive role while sustaining the recent
separation-of-powers results in an intellectually coherent fashion.
The Court's opinions in Bowsher and Schor illustrate the difficulties
that have long plagued the Court's efforts to give content to the
Constitution's structural principles in general, and separation-ofpowers precepts in particular.
The following pages address a series of questions suggested by
these introductory characterizations: First, do Bowsher and Schor really present the same issues, decided in differing ways? The dissenters in each-that is, those who, on this hypothesis, voted
consistently in both-vehemently insisted that the cases did indeed
present the same issues. However, one need not inquire further if it
is possible to discern distinctions supporting the differing approaches or rules for these approaches' invocation in varying circumstances. Second, if the issues are the same, can the Justices be
excused their inconsistencies of approach? Lawyers close to the
Supreme Court have long been aware that opinions issued in the
last few days of a Term must be regarded with caution; these opinions often reflect the extraordinary pressures the Justices encounter
in attempting to clear their docket of what are often the most difficult cases for decision. Does that consideration (or any other)
render this just a law professor's point-an interesting insight from
the Monday morning quarterback, but no occasion for criticism of
the Justices' enterprise? And finally, can one construct a map, a set
of precepts functional or formal, that can serve the ends and/or reflect the meanings embedded in the constitutional text and structure, and be administered with teeth and precision? Or is one
forced to the judgment voiced by Professor Choper15 and recently
given effect by the Court on the equally structural issue of federalism, 16 that identifying manageable judicial standards is so difficult
agencies are more effective across the range of governmental activities than multimember, "independent" commissions. Many agencies in each class have been less than fully
successful-an outcome as easily attributed to deficiencies in mandate, delegation, or
support as to governmental form. See generallyJaffe, The Illusion of the IdealAdministration,
86 HARV. L. REV. 1183 (1973). That the Occupational Safety and Health Administration
and the Environmental Protection Agency, attached agencies, have been more successful in carrying out their missions as instruments of government than the independent
agencies such as the Federal Reserve Board, the Securities and Exchange Commission,
and the National Labor Relations Board is a dubious proposition. More important, one
readily perceives aspects in the performance of the functions of the latter group that may
require greater remove from the world of politics than the former for ready public
acceptance.
1-5 J. CIIOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS: A FUNCrlONAI, RECONSIDERATION OF THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT (1980).

16

Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985).

For a full
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that the Court should forswear the enterprise and concentrate on
the protection of individual rights?
Readers are entitled to know about their guide that he has already staked out a position in these debates, opting for the difficult
middle ground of functionalism.1 7 That analysis, which will not be
repeated here, sought to show that our formal, three-branch theory
of government-at least as traditionally expressed-cannot describe
the government we long have had, is not required by the Constitution, and is not necessary to preserve the very real and desirable
benefits of "separation of powers" that form so fundamental an element of our constitutional scheme. The Constitution does not define the administrative, as distinct from the political, organs of the
federal government; it leaves that entirely to Congress.1 8 What the
Constitution describes instead are three generalist national institutions (Congress, President, and Supreme Court) which, together
with the states, serve as the principal heads of political and legal
authority. Each of these three generalist institutions serves as the
ultimate authority for a distinctive governmental authority-type (legislative, executive, or judicial). Each may be thought of as having a
paradigmatic relationship, characterized by that authority-type, with
the working government that Congress creates.
Although these heads of government serve distinct functions,
employing distinctive procedures, the analysis argued, the same
cannot be said of the administrative level of government. Virtually
every part of the government Congress has created-the Department of Agriculture as well as the Securities and Exchange Commission-exercises all three of the governmental functions the
Constitution so carefully allocates among Congress, President, and
Court. These agencies adopt rules having the shape and impact of
statutes, mold governmental policy through enforcement decisions
and other initiatives, and decide cases in ways that determine the
discussion of Garcia and its implications, see Rapaczynski, From SovereigntY to Process: The
Jurisprudenceof Federalism after Garcia, 1985 Sup. CT. REV. 341.
17 Strauss, supra note 5; see also Strauss, Was There a Baby in the Bathwater?,A Comment
on the Supreme Court's Legislative Veto Decision, 1983 DUKE L.J. 789 [hereinafter Strauss,
Legislative Veto].
18 The distinction between political and administrative government had its counterpart in early writings about administrative procedure that suggested a distinction between "executive power" and "administrative power." "Executive power" was
concerned with those issues ChiefJustice Marshall had identified in Marbury v. Madison,
5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 170 (1803), as "[q]uestions ... in their nature political." "Administrative power" was seen as strictly statutory, and subject to presidential participation
only to whatever extent might be provided by statute. See the elegant discussion of the
writings of Freund, Wyman, Willoughby and Goodnow in Grundstein, PresidentialPower
Administration and Administrative Law, 18 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 285 (1950). One need not

accept the proposition about complete congressional control of "administrative power"
to find force in the distinction.

1987]

FORMAL AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACHES

493

rights of private parties. If in 1787 such a merger of function was
unthinkable, in 1987 it is unavoidable given Congress's need to
delegate at some level the making of policy for a complex and interdependent economy, and the equal incapacity (and undesirability)
of the courts to resolve all matters appropriately characterized as
involving "adjudication." A formal theory of separation of powers
that says these functions cannot be joined is unworkable; that being
so, a theory that locates each agency "in" one or another of the
three conventional "branches" of American government, according
to its activities, fares no better. Respect for "framers' intent" is only
workable in the context of the actual present, and may require some
selectivity in just what it is we choose to respect-the open-ended
text, the indeterminacy of governmental form, the vision of a changing future, and the general purpose to avoid tyrannical government,
rather than a particular three-part model. The problem is finding a
way of maintaining the connection between each of the generalist
institutions and the paradigmatic function which it alone is empowered to serve, while retaining a grasp on government as a whole that
respects our commitments to the control of law.
This object can be achieved conformably to the words of the
Constitution, it was claimed, although at some cost to traditional
understandings, by observing that the concept of a "branch," as
such, is not required by the text. When the Constitution confers
power, it confers power on the three generalist political heads of
authority, not on branches as such.19 The constitutional text addresses
the powers only of the elected members of Congress, of the President as an individual, and of the Supreme Court and such inferior
federal courts as Congress might choose to establish. Its silence
about the shape of the inevitable, actual government was a product
both of drafting compromises and of the explicit purpose to leave
Congress free to make whatever arrangements it deemed "necessary
and proper" for the detailed pursuit of government purposes. One
can easily and properly infer some relationships that the three
named governmental actors must observe as among themselves and,
consequently, with whatever subordinate parts of government Congress chooses to create, without having to believe that those parts
must be located "here" or "there" in the government structure, or
that the governmental functions they may perform are restricted by
the accident of that location.
Rather than describe agencies in terms of branches, in other
words, the analysis suggested one could examine their relationships
19

Thus, the terms "actor," "constitutional actor," or "named head of govern-

ment" are used in place of "branch" in the following, unless the conventional view is
being described.
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with each of the three named heads of government, to see whether
those relationships undermine the intended distribution of authority among those three. 20 Just as contemporary property analysis tends
to speak of the property relationship as a "bundle of rights," no one
of which is essential to the characterization of a particular bundle as
having the attributes of "property," this analysis of separation-ofpowers issues proposes examining the quality of relationships between an agency and each of the three named heads of government.
It is not necessary to insist that there be particular relationships between an agency and any of the named constitutional actors (beyond
the few specified in the constitutional text) in order to require rela2
tionships of a certain overall character or quality. '
The reason for putting forward this possibly jarring view of our
institutional arrangements was to avoid two competing models, each
of which presents grave threats to two of the most fundamental values of our constitutional structure-first, that effectively carrying
out governmental objectives requires a powerful, independent, politically accountable, and unitary executive; and second that the "accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the
same hands . . . may justly be pronounced the very definition of
tyranny." 22 The first model, which may be described as that of the
"strong executive," regards all discretion conferred on agencies as
executive authority, subject to direct presidential control. This is
discretion as Chief Justice Marshall understood it in Marbury v.
Madison when he wrote that the Secretary of State, in his discretionary functions, "is to conform precisely to the will of the President.
He is the mere organ by whom that will is communicated. The acts
20 A related but different question would arise if one believed that a particular
agency had been created in circumstances so free of control by any of the three named
heads of government that it presented the risk of lawless, irresponsible, tyrannical government against which the Constitution guards respecting Congress, President, and
Court. An aspect of this problem is discussed infra at text following note 144.
21
Thus, it is suggested, presidential power to remove an official without cause from
a position of leadership in an agency is not a sine qua non of the president's relationship
with agencies responsible for carrying out the laws of the United States. Cf. Humphrey's
Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935). But this is not because the Federal Trade
Commission is not "in" "the executive branch," or performs no "executive" functiontwo misleading propositions the Humphrey's Executor Court thought it was required to
affirm. The FTC plainly performs executive functions (in contemporary characterizations, it does little else), and the former assertion is almost meaningless. Rather, this
judgment can be made in light of a complex of relationships that the President does
enjoy with such an agency-the power to appoint, to remove for cause, to consult, and
so on-and also in light of the relationships Congress has provided for itself in dealings
with the agency. A regime such as the FTC's which is generally structured to foster
objectivity and apoliticality-appropriate governmental ends-looks very different, in
this light, from one that enhances congressional relationships at the evident expense of
presidential ones.

22

THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 301

(J.

Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
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of such an officer, as an officer, can never be examinable by the
courts." 2 3 We still imagine such discretion in the limited context of
foreign affairs and a few like settings, but the years since the Marbury
decision have seen the emergence of administrative discretion exercised by agencies in all the characteristic forms of governmental action-legislative, executive, and judicial. Reluctance to concede to
the President himself the possibility of exercising all three functions
is what led me to reject the "simple" solution of regarding all administrative government as "executive." To permit the President
fully to govern the exercise of administrative discretion in these
forms is to accumulate all powers in his hands, in a sense that could
not be said of an agency exercising these powers subject to the over24
sight of President, Congress, and Court.
The second model, which could be called the "fourth branch"
model, is our traditional compromise: it treats some agencies as if
they were completely outside the President's grasp, and others as
within it. This approach fails to resolve the discretion-ordering
function for those agencies characterized as "executive," and represses recognition that they, too, exercise legislative and judicial
and executive functions. It also places the remaining agencies beyond the constitutional text. Any notion of a unitary executive is
destroyed if there are agencies responsible for carrying out public
laws to which the President may not speak in his office-characteristic
ways. The result is to enlarge Congress, rather than the President,
or else to cast some agencies loose of public control-either, a
deeply objectionable result. Any workable theory must not only
avoid placing excessive power in the President's hands, but also
maintain his claim to a central and unifying governmental role-that
is, to a relationship with all agencies that permits the exercise of his
characteristic functions.
Further reflection has persuaded me that these ends could also
be accomplished by viewing all agencies engaged in law-implemen5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 166 (1803).
Cf. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952) (article II does
not grant President authority to issue executive order directing Secretary of Commerce
to seize and operate steel mills). To be sure, in regulatory domains even the chief executive would remain subject to such other-branch constraints as statutory authorization
and judicial review. Only if those constraints seemed impaired, one could argue, would
separation-of-powers hazards mature. Cf. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United
States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) (grant to President of authority so large as to swamp likely
oversight capacity); Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935) (text of presidentially
adopted rules unpublished). Yet if I am right that contemporary administrative discretion assumes a form simply not envisioned by the drafters of the Constitution, this argument suggests taking a larger gamble than the Constitution requires. From the
perspective of the ends of separation of powers, it is a gamble we would be wiser not to
take.
23
24
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tation as "executive," while permitting Congress substantial freedom in structuring the precise character of their relationships with
the President. As distinct from the "strong executive" view of the
exercise of discretion voiced by Chief Justice Marshall, agencies
need not be the alter egos of the President. For some agencies, the
President's relationship may be characterized as one of oversight
rather than substitution ofjudgment. Under this modified approach
the SEC is a part of the executive branch even though its discretion
is exercised at greater remove from presidential supervision than,
say, the Department ofJustice. Even for the latter, as we have recognized, the fact that it exercises a characteristically executive function does not prevent Congress from enacting and enforcing
principles of White House noninterference. Calling all agencies
"executive" rather than simply "our government" would have the
rhetorical advantage of fitting our history and the resulting preconceptions more easily. What is essential to the move, however, is recognition that the changing character of "discretion" warrants
imposing limitations on the President's authority to command.
Otherwise, the move is made at the cost of encouraging the President to believe he can deal with those who exercise administrative
discretion as he does the Secretary of State.
I
ARE THE ISSUES THE SAME?

A.

Bowsher v. Synar

Bowsher v. Synar 25 concerns the constitutionality of the Balanced
Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985,26 popularly
known as the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act. As relevant to the litigation, that Act empowered the Comptroller General to resolve differences between the Director of the President's Office of
Management and Budget and the Director of the Congressional
Budget Office over the extent to which proposed budgetary legislation met the deficit-reducing standards of the Act. 2 7 The Comptroller General was also to make final 28 calculations of the revisions the
Act required should these projections fail to meet the deficit-reducing standards. The Court characterized these powers as "executive," and held that Congress could not constitutionally place their
exercise in the hands of an official subject to congressional removal
25 106 S. Ct. 3181 (1986).
26 Pub. L. No. 99-177, 1985 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws (99 Stat.) 1037 (codified in scattered sections of 2, 31 & 42 U.S.C. (Supp. III 1985)).
27 2 U.S.C. § 901 (Supp. III 1985).
28 Judicial review of those calculations was precluded by § 274(h) of the Act. Id.
§ 922(h).
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from office-that is, removal by a body outside the article II
29
executive.
Bowsher urgently required decision, for the first significant application of the draconian provisions of the deficit-control legislation
seemed likely to occur in the summer of 1986.30 The ChiefJustice's
opinion-his final word for the Court as ChiefJustice following his
rather surprising resignation-was formulaic and skeletal, emphasizing a formalistic analysis of the three separate and distinct
branches of American government familiar to all from high school
civics classes. The Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act conferred authority on the Comptroller General to carry out its provisions with legal
effect; a person or body authorized to execute the laws in this fashion employs the "executive power" conferred by the Constitution
on the President. 3' Yet by statute the Comptroller General serves a
fifteen-year term from which he may be removed only by impeachment or by a joint resolution of Congress enacted after a hearing to
determine whether he has given "cause" for the removal.3 2 In this
way, Congress has asserted an unusual 33 measure of control over
the Comptroller's tenure in office. Finding that this arrangement
inevitably would make the Comptroller General subservient to Congress, the Court held invalid the grant of executive authority to
him:3 4 "The Constitution does not contemplate an active role for
Congress in the supervision of officers charged with the execution
of the laws it enacts;" 3 5 "Congress cannot reserve for itself the
power of removal of an officer charged with execution of the laws
29
30

106 S. Ct. at 3192.

Indeed, the very importance of getting this case decided during 1986 may have
contributed to the Court's difficulties. The case came to the Court late in the Term,
virtually undeveloped by lower court proceedings, and required an accelerated briefing
schedule. In ordinary course it might have been a strong candidate for an order for
reargument. Certainly, in the past, the Court has used this method to buy time for
thoughtful decision. See, e.g., Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926). The Court's
difficulties in deciding separation-of-powers questions have, however, often been compounded by the necessity of reaching a speedy decision. See, e.g., United States v. Nixon,
418 U.S. 683 (1974); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
31
106 S. Ct. at 3188.
32 31 U.S.C. § 703(b),(e)(1) (1982).
33
To my knowledge, no other officials exercising "executive" functions serve subject solely to congressionally initiated and controlled removal proceedings.
34 It would also have been possible-as Justice Blackmun's dissent urged-to strike
out the provisions giving Congress control over the Comptroller General's tenure while
retaining his authority to act. 106 S. Ct. at 3215 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The majority's judgment that Congress would not have delegated such authority to the Comptroller absent his complete independence from the President seems reasonable in light of
the history of the statute, as well as its explicit provision for a fallback scheme, 2 U.S.C.
§ 922(f) (Supp. III 1985), in case the Comptroller General's authority should be held
invalid.
35
106 S. Ct. at 3187. It seems unlikely that Chief Justice Burger meant to cast a
constitutional shadow on oversight committees, the budget process, and the other polit-
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except by impeachment;" 3 6 and "[t]o permit an officer controlled by
Congress to execute the laws would be... to permit a congressional
37
veto."
The factual premise of these propositions-that the arrangements Congress made respecting the Comptroller General's removal create congressional control over his administration-is the
most difficult element of the analysis, taken on its own terms. As
Justices Stevens, Blackmun, and White asserted,3 8 the Court had
earlier relied upon a "for cause" removal provision as precisely the
element creating the independence from the President that justified
delegation of judicial and legislative functions to an "independent
regulatory commission";39 and the Court worked hard to maintain
the validity of such delegations. The Bowsher removal provision actually required presidential participation, for Congress's joint resolution of removal was subject to presidential veto; and it presumably
invited judicial review as to "cause." ' 40 Congress even denied itself
the carrot of an insecure incumbent's wish for reappointment; by
statute, the Comptroller General is limited to a single fifteen-year
term.4 1 Thus, the proposition of dependency-in-fact by virtue of the
removal provision is extremely hard to maintain. "Barring resignation, death, physical or mental incapacity, or extremely bad behavior, the Comptroller General is assured his tenure if he wants it, and
42
not a day more."
To reach this conclusion is not to say that the Bowsher result is
necessarily wrong, with nothing more to support it than arid formalism. The Court might have looked more globally at the relationships between Congress and the General Accounting Office, seeing
ical means by which Congress checks the President and the agencies. "[S]upervision" is
meant in the technical sense-as order-giving rather than as oversight.
36 Id. at 3188. This framing of the proposition was evidently an effort to defuse any
suggestion that the majority was undercutting the result in Humphrey's Executor v.
United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935), upholding congressional limitations on the President's power to remove an FTC Commissioner. It recasts the conventional distinction
between that case and Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926), by stressing the element of congressional participation in removal in the latter, and its absence in the former. See Strauss, supra note 5, at 614-15.
37
106 S. Ct. at 3189.
38 Id. at 3194-95 (Stevens,J., concurring); id. at 3216 n.1 (Blackmun,J., dissenting);
id. at 3209 (White, J., dissenting).
39 Id. at 3195 (Stevens, J., concurring) (referring to Humphrey's Executor, 295 U.S.
602 (1935)).
40
The majority said of reviewability only that the Solicitor General was unwilling to
endorse it.
Id. at 3190. The other opinions implicitly or explicitly assumed the availability of review. Id. at 3195 (Stevens, J., concurring); id. at 3211 (White, J., dissenting); id.
at 3215 n.1 (Blackmun,J., dissenting).
41
31 U.S.C. § 703(b) (1982).
42
F. MOSHER, THE GAO: THE QUEST FOR ACCOUNTABILITY IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 242 (1979), quoted in Bowsher, 106 S.Ct. at 3213 (White, J., dissenting).
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how the bundle of relationships, formal and informal, creates for the
agency a distinctive atmosphere and self-image that does not characterize other agencies. These relationships also create, at the congressional end, a unique intermingling of executive and legislative
functions. That intermingling, in turn, raises threats to the courts'
capacity to enforce the constraints of law that ought to be a matter
of deep concern. Such an inquiry might have looked, with equal attention, at the way in which the congressional arrangements would
deny the President a role in the execution of the laws, and also exclude the courts from any participation in control. One provision,
for example, restricts the President's exercise of his appointment
power by forcing him to choose a Comptroller General from a slate
of three candidates proposed jointly by the House and Senate leadership. 4 3 Another permits the Comptroller General to veto presidential reallocations of military appropriations. 44 A third makes the
Comptroller General's decisions final, subject to no judicial review
45
whatsoever.
The Court's approach may well have been a function of the particular arguments made to it, and the hasty development of the case
on the Court's docket may have prevented it from fully exploring
the issues. 46 Or the Court may have believed that making an issue
of the President's impoverished relationship with the agency would
place the independent regulatory commissions in greater jeopardy
by reopening issues concerning presidential removal power. Yet no
such reopening need occur.
Rather than argue that particular relationships (such as the removal power) are necessary, the alternative inquiry I suggest would
have focused upon the overall framework of relationships, a framework whose elements might vary. Viewed in this light, the lines of
control and influence running from the office of the President to the
independent regulatory commissions are much more numerous,
thick, and strong than those connecting that office to the GAO.
Even the "for cause" removal restrictions join President and independent agency: it is the President who determines whether cause
exists in the first instance and, as the majority observed to other
purposes in Bowsher, what may constitute "cause" is (perhaps fortu43
31 U.S.C. § 703(e)(3) (1982). Imagine such a restriction on the appointment of
the Secretary of State or even (if an important independent regulatory commission is
desired) the Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board or of the Securities and Exchange
Commission. If, taking the majority at its word, the Comptroller General is an executive
officer of the United States in the constitutional sense, what is to restrain Congress from
imposing similar restrictions on those appointments?
44 2 U.S.C. § 901(d) (Supp. III 1985).
45 Id. § 922(h).
46 See supra note 30.
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nately) undefined. 4 7 The independence at issue in such agencies is
merely relative, as one taking the broader view would quickly perceive. The majority's exclusive focus on a particular formal relationship with Congress required a factual premise that cannot be
sustained. Of course the broader view is a more difficult enterprise,
a point to which we will return; yet, it does not require false
assumptions.
Justice Stevens concurred in an opinion joined by Justice Marshall, apparently driven by a realization of the weakness of the majority's premise of control-in-fact. He suggested a different, but in
its way equally formal, tripartite analysis of the problem facing the
Court. Justice Stevens first asked where the Comptroller General
"was" rather than what he was doing. "[O]ne of the identifying
characteristics of the Comptroller General is his statutorily required
relationship to the Legislative Branch." 48 Was it unconstitutional
that his "current statutory responsibilities also envision a role ...
with respect to the Executive Branch?"' 49 No, for many examples of
such a mixed relationship could be cited; "[o]bligations to two
Branches are not ... impermissible, and the presence of such dual
obligations does not prevent the characterization of the official ...
as part of one branch" 5 0 -in this case, Congress. Nor need the particular function being performed by the Comptroller General be
characterized as "executive." Each branch exercises functions that
could be characterized as executive, legislative, and judicial.
"[G]overnmental power cannot always be readily characterized with
only one of those three labels. On the contrary, . . . a particular
function, like a chameleon, will often take on the aspect of the office
to which it is assigned." 5 ' The Comptroller General's decision
could also be made by Congress (as the fallback provision suggests
it now will be) and in that case clearly would embody a "legislative"
action.
Indeed, that is the observation that drives Justice Stevens' judgment that the legislature's delegation was unconstitutional: when a
congressional employee acts in a way that is unmistakably "executive" (Capitol police making an arrest; the Librarian of Congress
implementing statutory directives), that may be inescapable; but
"[i]f Congress were free to delegate its policymaking authority to
one of its components ... it would be able to evade" the constitutional restraints on the legislative process. 5 2 Delegation of rulemak47
48
49
50

51
52

See Strauss, supra note 5, at 615.
106 S. Ct. at 3196 (Stevens, J., concurring).
Id. at 3198.
Id. at 3198-99.
Id. at 3200.
Id. at 3203.
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ing power to independent or executive agencies does not present
this threat; that delegation disperses rather than concentrates and
sequesters power. Thus, the issue is not how executive officials may
act, but how Congress may act. Because Congress itself is authorized to act with legally binding effect only through the enactment of
statutes, it cannot delegate the making of policy having equivalent
force and effect to an agent of the legislative branch who will act
without observing the formalities of statutory enactment.5 3
Justice White's dissent was the principal voice raised in opposition to the Bowsher majority's "distressingly formalistic view of separation of powers as a bar to the attainment of governmental
objectives."'5 4 Accepting the majority's characterization of the
Comptroller General's authority as "executive," Justice White
found the tenure controls Congress had reserved indistinguishable
in practice from those that assure the independence of the independent regulatory commissions, and hence unobjectionable.
Such limits as there may be to Congress's control of presidential
removal are a function of" 'the extent to which [they] prevent[] the
Executive Branch from accomplishing its constitutionally assigned
functions.' ,55 This is not a bright-line inquiry; Justice White preferred the uncertainty of functional inquiry to the difficulties of "formalistic and unbending rules." From a functional perspective,
Justice White found no difficulty. Assigning the Comptroller General's functions under the Act to an officer not subject to presidential removal at will presents no problem, because those functions
are not central to the presidency-in fact, they lie closer to Con53 Justice Stevens' approach has the decided advantage of avoiding future appointments clause problems, see supra note 43, but echoes the Court's opinion in INS v.
Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983), and thus suffers from Chadha's defects. See Strauss, Legislative Veto, supra note 17. Indeed, one can understand the legislative veto as a device to
avoid the President's participation in the legislative process. See Strauss, supra note 5, at
651-53. Putting the matter in this formal way, however, invites one to attempt the same
analysis with the other "branches." The result, one supposes, is that lower level judicial
officials would be free to act executively or legislatively, but not judicially, and lower
level executive officials could act judicially; or legislatively, but not in an executive fashion. Thus, the formal reasoning is far from satisfactory. Justice Stevens' observation
that essential controls have been defeated, however, is central.
54
106 S. Ct. at 3205 (WhiteJ., dissenting). Justice Blackmun's dissent would have
avoided deciding on the majority's separation-of-powers issue by finding that the plaintiffs in the case were not entitled to the relief they sought (a declaration that the 1985
statute was invalid) and that any questions that might be raised about Congress's removal power under the 1921 statute, while important and substantial, were premature.
Id. at 3215 (Blackmun,J., dissenting). Justice Stevens' approach was no more persuasive
for Justice Blackmun; the Comptroller General's protected tenure made him an independent actor indistinguishable from a regulatory commissioner as an appropriate
recipient of what was in effect rulemaking authority. Id. at 3215 n.1.
!55 Id. at 3207 (White, J., dissenting) (quoting Nixon v. Administrator of General
Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 443 (1977)).
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gress. The Comptroller General has little policy-making discretion,
and Congress's decision to seek a nonpartisan actor who would "not
... allow his calculations to be colored by political considerations"
is sensible, and "deprives the President of no authority that is rightfully his." 5 6 As a matter of factual characterization, the President's
veto power over removal "reduces to utter insignificance" any
57
threat of subservience by the Comptroller General to Congress.
"The practical result ... is ... to render [the Comptroller] one of
the most independent officers in the entire federal establishment." 58
Justice White characterized the Court's invalidation of congressional participation in removal as the product of "rigid dogma": 5 9
[A]n unyielding principle to strike down a statute posing no real
danger of aggrandizement of congressional power is extremely
misguided and insensitive to our constitutional role ....
[T]he
role of this Court should be limited to determining whether the
Act so alters the balance of authority among the branches of government as to pose a genuine threat to the basic division between
the lawmaking power and the power to execute the law. 60
B.

Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Schor

Schor 6 ' neither presented such urgent issues nor made unusual
demands on the ordinary timetable of the Justices (or of the attorneys who prepared the case for argument before them). It concerned the constitutionality of the Commodity Futures Trading
Commission's rule permitting the Commission to entertain common
law counterclaims, arising under state law, in agency proceedings a
broker's client had initiated to recover reparations for alleged violations of the Commission's regulations. Ordinarily, such issues
would be decided by state courts or in diversity actions. The argument-given color by the Court's decision four years earlier in
Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co.6 2-was that
article III precluded Congress from assigning the adjudication of
these issues to an administrative agency such as the CFTC. This
appearance was, in fact, the case's second on the Supreme Court's
docket. In 1984, relying on Northern Pipeline, the D.C. Circuit had
found against the CFTC's exercise of jurisdiction. 63 The Supreme
56

Id. at 3208.

57

Id. at 3212.

58
-5o

Id. at 3213.
Id. at 3214.

60

Id. at 3214-15.
106 S. Ct. 3245 (1986).

61
62
65

458 U.S. 50 (1982).

Schor v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, 740 F.2d 1262 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
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Court had vacated and remanded that decision 6 4 for reconsideration
in light of its intervening decision in Thomas v. Union CarbideAgricultural Products Co. 6 5 The D.C. Circuit reiterated its conclusion after
reargument; 66 the case then came before the Supreme Court in ordinary course.
Understanding the Schor case requires at least a brief excursion
through the separation-of-powers doctrine in the judicial context, a
context whose problematic character is reflected in the NorthernPipeline decision. Northern Pipeline concerned 1978 revisions of the Bankruptcy Act that permitted non-article III bankruptcy judges to
perform virtually all judicial functions in bankruptcy cases-in particular, to resolve, without regard to any objections of the party opposing the bankrupt, a contractual matter that ordinarily would be
decided upon by a state court under common law. Only limited
provisions were made for judicial review of bankruptcy court judgments. While six members of the Court found the 1978 revisions to
be an unconstitutional delegation of judicial authority, the Court
failed to produce a majority opinion. A plurality of four, Justice
Brennan writing, grounded its analysis in a formal separation-ofpowers argument about article III judicial power. 6 7 Justices Rehnquist and O'Connor joined that judgment on narrow grounds that
appeared to rest on the involvement of an issue arising under state
common law. 68 Finally, Justice White dissented 69 in terms very like
those of his dissent in Bowsher, arguing that the legislative arrangements Congress had made seemed sensible to him, and presented
no discernible threat, in and of themselves, to the article III
courts.

70

Justice Brennan's formal argument drew on the analysis used in
Crowell v. Benson,7 1 a decision that, despite its own formalism, was
ultimately credited with sustaining the assignment of some adjudicatory functions to administrative agencies. 72 Describing the functions of a deputy commissioner of the independent United States
105 S. Ct. 3551 (1985).
473 U.S. 568 (1985). Thomas, a case restricting Northern Pipeline, is briefly discussed infra at text accompanying notes 73-77.
66 770 F.2d 211 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
67 Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 52 (plurality opinion in which Justices Marshall,
Blackmun, and Stevens joined Justice Brennan).
68 Id. at 89 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in judgment).
69
Id. at 92 (White, J., dissenting). Chief Justice Burger and Justice Powell joined
with Justice White. ChiefJustice Burger also wrote a separate opinion. Id. at 92 (Burger, CJ., dissenting).
70
Northern lipeline is discussed in Monaghan, Marbury and the Administrative State, 83
Coinm. L. REv. 1, 18-20 (1983); Redish, Legislative Courts, Admzinistrative Agencies and the
Northern Pipeline Derision, 1983 DUKE L.J. 197; and Strauss, supra note 5,at 629.
71 285 U.S. 22 (1932).
72
See, e.g., Monaghan, supra note 70, at 18-20.
64
65
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Employees' Compensation Commission in deciding workers' compensation cases, the Crowell Court saw itself as choosing between
characterizing his routine function as involving "public rights" of no
necessary concern to the courts, and finding him to be an "adjunct"
of the article III courts. If the matter the adjudicator was empowered to decide had no necessarily judicial component-if it was "executive" or "legislative" and hence could properly be resolved even
if the judiciary were totally excluded-the adjudicator need not be
placed in an article III institution. But if the matter did require judicial participation, and claims arising under state common law were
paradigms of such matters, then it had to be possible to regard the
adjudicator as an "adjunct" of an article III court and in some sense
"within" the judicial branch. Thus, a two-part analysis was to be
undertaken: First, whether judicial involvement is required; and second, if so, whether the adjudicator can fairly be described as enjoying "adjunct" status. ForJustice Brennan in Northern Pipeline, the
disputes between private citizens at stake in bankruptcy proceedings
could not be characterized as involving "public rights," and the
powers granted the bankruptcy judges by the 1978 revisions made
them at once too powerful and too remote from article III courts to
be characterized as "adjuncts." As remarked, Justices Rehnquist
and O'Connor, who filled out the Northern Pipeline majority, rested
their judgment exclusively, it appeared, on the involvement of a
state common law issue in the particular case.
Thomas, 73 the next case, involved a dispute arising under the
Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA). A
provision of FIFRA authorized the federal Environmental Protection Agency to use one manufacturer's research data about the
health, safety, and environmental effects of its pesticide in considering another manufacturer's later application to register a similar
product. As a condition of that use, the "follow-on" registrant had
to offer to compensate the first manufacturer, and to agree to binding arbitration should they disagree as to the amount, subject to, at
best, limited judicial review. The Court was unanimous in upholding
the statutory scheme, but the Justices' opinions varied in rationale.
Justice Brennan and two Justices who had joined his opinion in
Northern Pipeline7 4 sought to show how the statute at issue in Thomas
could be upheld under that opinion; 75 Justice O'Connor now wrote
for a majority of the Court and stressed that functional, not formal,
analysis was the appropriate means for resolving constitutional disputes about congressional assignment of judicial business to other774
75

473 U.S. 568 (1985).
Justices Marshall and Blackmun. Justice Stevens also wrote separately.
473 U.S. at 599-600 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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than-article-III courts. 7 6 She gave three reasons why the "independent role of the judiciary in our constitutional scheme" was
not threatened by the very limited provision for judicial
involvement:
[1] the right [at issue] is not a purely "private" right, but bears
many of the characteristics of a "public" right. Use of a registrant's data to support a follow-on registration serves a public
purpose as an integral part of a program safeguarding the public
health. Congress has the power, under Article I, to authorize an
agency administering a complex regulatory scheme to allocate
costs and benefits among voluntary participants in the program
without providing an Article III adjudication.
[2]

...

the FIFRA arbitration scheme incorporates its own

system of internal sanctions and relies only tangentially, if at all,
on the Judicial Branch for enforcement. The danger of Congress
or the Executive encroaching on the Article III judicial powers is
at a minimum when no unwilling defendant is subjected to judicial
enforcement power as a result of the agency "adjudication."
...

[U]nder FIFRA, the only potential object of judicial en-

forcement power is the follow-on registrant who explicitly consents to have his rights determined by arbitration.
[3]

... FIFRA at a minimum allows private parties to secure

Article III review of the arbitrator's "findings and determination"
for fraud, misconduct, or misrepresentation. This provision protects against arbitrators who abuse or exceed their powers or willfully misconstrue their mandate under the governing law.
Moreover, review of constitutional error is preserved, and FIFRA,
therefore, does not obstruct whatever judicial review might be re77
quired by due process.
This, then, is the context within which Schor arose: an established
dispute between the use of formal and functional methods of analysis in which the latter apparently had prevailed; and also a special
sensitivity about the assignment to federal tribunals other than article III courts of disputes between private citizens turning on questions of state common law.
Although the Court might have been troubled, in the abstract,
even by the CFTC's authority to entertain private actions to recover
damages for violations, 78 the particular circumstances of Schor made
76 Id. at 582-94 (majority opinion). Justice O'Connor was joined by ChiefJustice
Burger and Justices White, Powell, and Rehnquist.
77
Id. at 589-92 (citations omitted).
78
In seeking certiorari, the Solicitor General had to discuss the significance of the
D.C. Circuit's decision. He cited no other setting in which federal agencies currently
exercise such authority. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, Schor (Nos. 85-621. 85-642). But see
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the case about as unattractive for upholding Schor's constitutional
claim as the legislative background of Bowsher had invited judicial
intervention. One obvious undercurrent in Bowsher was that Congress, directly focused on the separation-of-powers problems, had
attempted to pull a fast one, undercutting the President. In Schor it
was the plaintiff who appeared to hold that position. Schor had invoked the CFTC's jurisdiction for his claims that his broker had violated CFTC regulations, when he might have chosen to sue in
district court. When Schor's broker sued him in federal district
court, in diversity jurisdiction, Schor sought dismissal of that action
on the ground that the matter could be brought before the CFTC
under its counterclaim jurisdiction. Schor did not first raise his constitutional objections to that jurisdiction until a Commission administrative law judge had first ruled preliminarily against him on the
merits. This factual background, of course, does not answer the
question whether Congress may lawfully empower the CFTC to entertain such claims; yet to the extent that Schor's claim was to the
personal benefit of an "independent and impartial" judiciary, he evidently had compromised its force. The briefs in the case under79
standably stressed the issue of consent.
Six Justices joined justice O'Connor's majority opinion upholding CFTC jurisdiction over the counterclaim.8 0 Schor's earlier invocation of the CFTC's jurisdiction had taken out of the case any
consideration of the "individual rights" aspects of citizens' claims to
have disputes decided by article III courts. Although the majority
agreed that the separation-of-powers issue had to be reached, that
issue, Justice O'Connor asserted, was to be assessed by reference to
the purposes underlying article III, with " 'practical attention to
substance rather than doctrinaire reliance on formal categories.' "81
Perishable Agricultural Commodities Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 499f-499g (1982). Rather, the

threats he identified were to other arrangements for referring disputes that ordinarily
would be decided by article III courts to other tribunals with party consent. Id. at 20-21.
The Federal Arbitration Act, the Federal Magistrates Act, and the use of masters and
referees are examples. Mention also was made, id. at 26-28, of proposals for federal

judicial reform that might involve creation of alternative tribunals-for example, to consider Social Security Act matters-as one means of dealing with the burgeoning caseload
of the federal courts. The effect was to focus the significance of the case on judicial
more than administrative activity.
79 Brief for the Commodity Futures Trading Commission at 28-41, Scor (Nos. 85621, 85-642); Brief for Respondents at 38-42, Schor (Nos. 85-621, 85-642). Schor asserted that his "consent" had been purchased at too high a cost-in effect, that it would
be an "unconstitutional condition" for Congress to make his ability to use the CFTC
contingent on his willingness to have counterclaims decided there. That argument did
not attract a single adherent.
80 Chief.Justice Burger and Justices White, Blackmun, Powell, Rehnquist. and Stcvens joincd with Justice O'Connor.
81 106 S. Ct. at 3256 (quoting Thomas, 473 U.S. at 587).
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She relied heavily on the majority opinion in the Thomas case in defining as the relevant issue whether Congress's action would
" 'emasculat[e]' constitutional courts,"8 2 leading to " 'the encroachment or aggrandizement of one branch at the expense of the
other.' "83 This appears to be just the inquiry thatJustice White had
84
called for in Bowsher.
In deciding whether assigning business to a "non-Article III tribunal impermissibly threatens the institutional integrity of the Judicial Branch," Justice O'Connor wrote, "the Court has declined to
adopt formalistic and unbending rules." 85 Congress must be free to
take "needed and innovative action pursuant to its Article I powers." 86 Factors for the courts to consider, none in itself determinative, include the extent to which the "essential attributes ofjudicial
power" remain in article III tribunals, the range and scope of delegation, and the concerns leading Congress to act.8 7 Here the Court
found no objectionable intrusion into judicial authority: the CFTC's
exclusive jurisdiction was limited, clearly linked to its primary responsibilities, and understandable as promoting an appropriate
congressional purpose-namely, fostering efficient resolution of
disputes and thus promoting compliance with the statutory
scheme.8 8 Beyond this, the jurisdiction of the CFTC merely paralleled that of the courts and did not preclude it. CFTC jurisdiction
required district court action for enforcement, and thus would be
subject to reasonably tight review, including substantial evidence review of its findings of fact and de novo review of its legal conclusions.8 9 In this context, the state common law character of the claim
ought not be regarded as "talismanic"; although the claim's character magnifies the risks of improper encroachment, this case presents
82 Id. at 3257 (quoting National Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S.
582, 644 (1949) (Vinson, CJ., dissenting)).
83
Id. at 3257 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 122 (1976)). Buckle. is another
of the Court's treatments of separation-of-powers problems, one that (in this respect at
least) seems functional in its orientation.
84
106 S. Ct. at 3207 (White, J., dissenting).
85 Schor, 106 S. Ct. at 3258.

86

Id.

Id.
id.
Id. at 3258-59. The Court had no occasion to say what it meant by this observation. Review of CFTC decisions occurs under provisions, 7 U.S.C. §§ 9, 18(e) (1982),
that essentially track the Administrative Procedure Act, and that have been held to invoke its provision on scope of review, 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1982). Cardoza v. CFTC, 768
F.2d 1542, 1552 (7th Cir. 1985). Under current interpretations, APA review often involves acceptance of an agency's reasonable legal conclusions. See, e.g., Chevron, U.S.A.,
Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984). The ordinary
bases suggested for such acceptance of agency judgments would not easily extend, however, to agency judgments about the meaning of state common law rules. Cf. Ford Motor Co. v. FTC, 673 F.2d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 999 (1982).
87

88
89
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no "substantial threat to the separation of powers. ' '90
Justices Brennan and Marshall dissented, following a formal
analysis like that in Bowsher and voicing passionate dismay at the
Court's lack of consistency. Ours is a government of three distinct
branches, they reasoned, each of which must be maintained "'entirely free from the control or coercive influence, direct or indirect,
of either of the others.' "91 Repeating the analysis that had attracted
four votes in Northern Pipeline and three votes in Thomas, and had
now lost further support, they insisted that the judicial power must
be vested in article III courts, subject only to narrow exceptions
which could not include agency adjudication of state common law
counterclaims in disputes between private parties. The "important
functions of Article III are too central to our constitutional scheme
to risk their incremental erosion," 92 which "abdication to claims of
legislative convenience ' 93 threatens. The balance between concrete
gains in efficiency and convenience promised by legislative assignments of matters to agency decision, and the more remote and theoretical benefits of separation of powers, will never appear to favor
the latter in any particular case. It is not significant that the CFTC
shares jurisdiction with the judiciary; 94 permitting Congress to make
article I courts attractive, even if article III courts remain formally
open, is tantamount to permitting Congress to destroy article III
courts. 95 The reasoning of the majority would allow few stopping
points, they feared, if Congress were to become more aggressive in
permitting federal agency entertainment of counterclaims.
"[D]ilution of judicial power operates to impair the protections of
Article III regardless of whether Congress acted with the 'good intention' of providing a more efficient dispute resolution system or
with the 'bad intention' of strengthening the Legislative Branch at
the expense of the judiciary." 9 6 As in Bowsher, so here, the dissent
argued, it is necessary to endure the inconvenience of separated
90

91

106 S. Ct. at 3259-60.
Id. at 3262 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Bowshe, 106 S. Ct. at 3188 which

quotes Hhmphrey's Executor, 295 U.S. at 629).
92 Id. at 3263.
93 Id. at 3264.
94 See id. at 3265 ("[A]ny 'sharing' ofjurisdiction is more illusory than real.").
95 See id. ("If the administrative reparations proceeding is so much more convenient
and efficient than litigation in federal district court that abrogation of Article III's commands is warranted, it seems to me that complainants would rarely, if ever, choose to go
to district court in the first instance.").
96 Id. at 3266. One might not appreciate the contemporary importance of this argument simply from reading the opinions in the case. Turning to the briefs, however,
one is immediately struck that what appears to the parties-particularly to the Departmcnt of Justice-to be at stake is the future ofjudicial reform rather than the future of
administrative action. See supra note 78. Avoiding an opinion that would inhibit transfer
of Social Security Act appeals to an article I court, rather than avoiding an outcome that
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97
powers in order to secure liberty.
The majority approach in Schor repudiates not only the formalist analysis of the Northern Pipeline plurality, but also the analytic
structure underpinning Crowell v. Benson.98 To the Crowell Court it
had seemed to matter, at least as an issue of metaphor, "where" in
government an administrative adjudication was regarded as having
been placed. 9 9 As applied to adjudicators who were commission
employees indistinguishable from the employees of other regulatory
commissions then extant, the "adjunct" characterization was fictive
even in 1932;100 unlike a United States magistrate' 0 1 or even a bankruptcy judge, 10 2 a deputy commissioner had no formal connection
whatever with the judiciary, apart from the provision for review of
his decisions once final. In this respect, the Crowell Court's approach may be regarded as functional; in the end it insisted that
"regard must be had ... not to mere matters of form but to the
substance of what is required,"' 1 3 and that from this perspective a
suitable arrangement for judicial review "provides for the appropriate exercise of the judicial function." 10 4 Nonetheless, the fictive
"adjunct" relationship in Crowell carried with it certain standards of
review as a matter of constitutional necessity: independent judicial
redetermination of certain "constitutional" or "jurisdictional" facts;
relatively intense review of other factual determinations; and "full"
judicial authority to deal with all matters of law. 10 5 Schor makes no
mention of the "adjunct" aspect of Crowell; evidently, locating the
06
branch in which the CFTC sits is no longer thought important.'
The fundamental requirements of judicial involvement voiced in
Crowell now appear as important, but nondeterminative, "factors."
Thus, as welcome as abandonment of the "adjunct" fiction may be,
it also raises certain risks. In substituting a general, functional anal-

would cast doubt on other contemporary administrative adjudication, is the program
that stalks the pages of the government's brief.
97
106 S. Ct. at 3265 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
98 285 U.S. 22 (1932).
99 Id. at 56-58.
100 Id. at 68, 70 & n.5 (Brandeis, J. dissenting).
101 See United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667 (1980) (upholding constitutionality of
U.S. magistrates).
102
See Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. 50 (1982).
103
Crowell, 285 U.S. at 53.
Id. at 54.
104
105 Id. at 46, 54, 62.
106 As a metaphysical exercise, it would also be rather problematic. Deputy commissioners appear only to have decided workers' compensation claims. The CFTC makes
rules and reaches enforcement decisions as well as engages in adjudication. Even in
adjudication it most often engages in activities for which the Crowell review constraints
would now be thought inappropriate-as when it interprets its own rules or governing
statute. See supra note 89.
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ysis for Crowell's relatively formal two-part analytic structure, the
Schor Court threatens the basis for insisting on the Crowell standards
of review even as it observes that these standards are in fact provided for in the case at hand.
It thus appears that a majority of the Court, on that first Monday in July, sought to have it both ways on the subject of separation
of powers. For five of the Justices-Chief Justice Burger and Justices Rehnquist, Powell, O'Connor, and Stevens-the proper approach in Bowsher appeared to be quite formal: figure out which
"branch" the actor is in (or which branch's function he is exercising)
and then see whether the formal requirements that ensue from that
inquiry are inconsistent with the provisions of the statute under
challenge. However minor or understandable that inconsistency
might be, it condemns the statutory scheme. If these five Justices
had undertaken the same inquiry in Schor (as Justice Brennan did in
his Schor dissent), they would have been forced to conclude that the
CFTC was exercising ajudicial function (by resolving a legal dispute
arising between two private parties under state common law)
outside the article IIIjudiciary. But the only question these five Justices asked in Schor was whether this convenient and well-controlled
arrangement unavoidably threatened one branch's (here the judiciary's) performance of its most central constitutional functions.
Again, if that had been the inquiry these five undertook in Bowsher
(as Justice White did in his Bowsher dissent), they might well have
concluded that Congress's very limited reservation of control over
the Comptroller General's tenure in office, and his marginal performance of executive function, generated no such threat to the
presidency.
II
CAN THE CASES BE RECONCILED?

This remarkable juxtaposition might be taken as further evidence of the claims of latter-day legal realists about the indeterminacy of law and the basic power-orientation of the legal apparatus.
Yet, for me, as an existential proposition, to embrace those claims is
to repudiate the enterprise. That the judge's obligation is one of
consistency in her own reasoning in like cases-the very obligation
of coherent explanation that she enforces on agencies such as the
CFTC when their work comes before her for review-is the very
premise of her authority.10 7 A judiciary that asserts the power to
107
See Monaghan, Taking Supreme Court Opinions Seriously, 39 MD. L. REV. 1 (1979)
(criticizing Supreme Court's willingness to abandon stare decisis); Wechsler, Tou'ard
Neutral Principles of ConstitutionalLaw, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1, 15 (1959) (court decision
"must be genuinely principled, resting.., on analysis and reason quite transcending the
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impose legal obligation or sanction without recognizing the duty of
coherence and explanation is one I would not choose, and one that
we as a people have not chosen.
Justice O'Connor, of course, asserted no such power for the
Court, but the explanation she essayed was a skeletal one:
Nor does our decision in Bowsher v. Synar require a contrary
result. Unlike Bowsher, this case raises no question of the aggrandizement of congressional power at the expense of a coordinate
branch. Instead, the separation of powers question presented in
this case is whether Congress impermissibly undermined, without
appreciable expansion of its own power, the role of the Judicial
Branch. In any case, we have, consistent with Bowsher, looked to a
number of factors in evaluating the extent to which the congressional scheme endangers separation of powers principles under
the circumstances presented, but have found no genuine threat to
those principles to be present in this case.
In so doing, we have also been faithful to our Article III
precedents, which counsel that bright line rules cannot effectively
be employed to yield broad principles applicable in all Article III
inquiries. See, e.g., Thomas, supra. Rather, due regard must be
given in each case to the unique aspects of the congressional plan
at issue and its practical consequences in light of the larger concerns that underlie Article 111.108
Is it that "aggrandizement" is the key to activate a formalist approach? That article III separation-of-powers cases are different in
principle from those arising under articles I and II? Or, perhaps, is
it more simply that the Court finds itself facing the dilemma once
described by Justice Cardozo, that of the judge who is surer how she
must decide than able to explain why?' 09 The government we have
built and now live with has attained a complexity and intermarriage
of function that beggars the rationalistic tripartite schemes of the
immediate result that is achieved"). But cf. Easterbrook, W1ays of Criticizing the Court, 95
HARv. L. REV. 802 (1982) (one can demand consistent decisions from particular judge

but not from Supreme Court as institution without forcing it to sacrifice its institutional
nature).
108
106 S. Ct. at 3261 (citations omitted).
109 "Often he fumbles about, feeling in a vague way that some such problem is involved, but missing the universal element which would have quickened his decision with
the inspiration of a principle." B. CARDOZO, THE GROWTH OF THE LAw 102 (1924) (discussing Hynes v. New York Cent. R.R., 231 N.Y. 229, 131 N.E. 898 (1921)). Driven to
the realization that the law's analytic forms permitted alternative answers in the Hynes
case, Judge Cardozo first understood it his obligation to demonstrate that state of affairs. Then and later he defended his choice of outcome on his "conception of the end
of the law, the function of legal liability ....Some theory of liability, some philosophy of
the end to be served by tightening or enlarging the circle of rights and remedies, is at
the root of any decision in novel situations when analogies are equivocal and precedents
are silent." Id. at 101-02. He would not have asserted, and did not assert, that he was
free either of explanation or of an obligation to consistency so far as he could attain it.
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eighteenth century. Identifying a satisfactory principle for assessing
the permissibility of distributions of governmental power, much less
one that can be rooted in the "separation-of-powers" framework,
may simply be too much to expect.1 10
The element perhaps most remarkable in Justice O'Connor's
brief explanation of the Court's action lies in its opaqueness to the
contrasting styles employed in the two opinions: the formal, tripartite scheme of neatly characterized and separated branches and
functions in Bowsher, and the "core function" analysis inquiring, not
into overlap, but into fundamental impairment of role in Schor. One
could even say that the two opinions represent poles frequently encountered in legal analysis, between rigid rule and individualized
judgment, between technical positivism and policy analysis.
The evidence of history is that resolution between these poles is
not to be expected-that, inescapably, judges require both techniques. On the one hand, clear rules contribute to planning, stability, even assurance that conduct can and will be governed by law.
Clarity and concreteness offer pronounced rhetorical advantages in
justifying a negative verdict on the constitutionality of a statute or
other activity undertaken by a powerful, coordinate branch of government. Yet such rules present the twin hazards of inflexibility in
the face of changing and unpredictably varying circumstances, and
of inviting evasion by their clarity. Much human wisdom is reflected
in what is not our failure but our unwillingness to attempt a full definition of fraud; fraud inheres in the efforts to circumnavigate such definitions as there may be. And the drafters or interpreters of a
Constitution, anticipating and even wishing continuing struggle and
irresolution over the dispersion of political power, could easily foresee a corresponding difficulty arising out of the attempt to specify
permitted allocations.
On the other hand, approaches grounded in holistic appreciation of the circumstances of particular disputes promise, in their
flexibility, both the potential for accommodating needed change
and a discriminating and direct response to the problem of evasion.
Yet these approaches raise larger questions about the legitimacy of
judicial action, both by enlarging the element ofjudicial personality
in the exercise ofjudicial power and by appearing to deprive outside
observers of a firm basis on which to appraise that exercise. And,
from a practical perspective, experience suggests that a flexible or
functional standard has only short-term advantages in dealing with
the evasion theme. Starting with McCulloch v. Maryland,II judicial
assurances that manipulative uses of doctrine could be identified
110
111

Cf.J. CHOPER, supra note 15, at 171-379.

17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
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and defended against have proved false. The force of common law
analytic methods in expanding from the base of the permitted has
simply been too strong and the defenses against that expansion
unadministrable.
In this respect, Justice Brennan will surely be vindicated as a
prophet if-as seems not unlikely given the current press to control
the explosive growth in litigation' "2 -the future puts his fears to the
test. It is his sense of the importance and vulnerability of the Court
that may explain the strong interest in formalism by a Justice so
often prone to insist on the Constitution's flexibility and adaptability. While "core function" may be the best that the most sophisticated of analysts can suggest,1"3 it has no stable content. At best,
"core function" analysis can guard against a sudden demarche, but
not against the step-by-step accretion of "reasonable" judgments
over time. The strength of flexibility is at the same time its weakness-as indeedJustice White's consistent inability to apply his analysis with bite may itself suggest.
Of course we want both the comfort of adaptation to changing
circumstances and the assurance that no one of the three designated
heads of our government will ever succeed in displacing either, let
alone both, of the others, despite their unending contention for
power. We can say, in that sense, that we know the ends to which
judicial effort ought to be bent. That knowledge, however, only
highlights the polarity inherent in these objectives and opens further questions about consistency or, barring that, the possibility of
agreeing on the ordering of these objectives. A resolution to this
problem can hardly be expected if the ends in view look resolutely
and irreconcilably in differing directions. On the whole, the voice of
adaptation is that of functionalism; the voice of assurance, that of
the classic and formal three-part division. Do we know which we
prefer? Is there a meta-rule that can establish which approach
should be taken in the event of conflict? Can one tease out of the
cases, or the circumstances in which they arise, any principles for
choosing between functional and formalistic approaches?
For evidence of the high stakes in this inquiry, one need look no
further than the recent brouhaha over the existence of limits on federal authority to regulate the affairs of state government. The history of judicial efforts to referee the apportionment of authority
between state and federal governments is also one that has witSee supra notes 78 & 89.
113 See Hart, The Power of Congress to Limit theJurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Exercise in
Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REv. 1362, 1372 (1953). But cf. Gunther, CongressionalPower to Curtail Federal Court Jurisdiction:An OpinionatedGuide to the Ongoing Debate, 36 STAN. L. REV.
201 (1984).
112
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nessed struggles between formalists (insisting that only certain governmental functions belong to the federal government, and that
others are reserved to the states) and functionalists (urging that the
only appropriate judicial role in a changing society is to protect the
"core functions" of state government). Here, too, those struggles
occurred in the service of separating power amongst the possible
instruments of government in the interest of protecting citizens'
freedom. I 4 Although separation-of-powers formalism appears to
have survived the New Deal," 5 federalism formalists were routed
during the New Deal's explosive endorsement of national authority
to deal with economic issues. Increasing federal efforts to g regulate the conduct of state government, and apparent appreciation of
t6
the political benefits to citizens of the federalist allocation,"
7
marked the emergence in National League of Cities v. Usery, 11 of an
analysis which (at least as subsequently interpreted'18) stressed interference with "core" state functions more than a catalog of do's
and don't's. In Garciav. San Antonio Metropolitan TransitAuthority 1 9 a
majority of the Court overruled Usery on the evidence of less than a
decade, pronounced this approach unworkable and abandoned to
the federal political process any effort to define the proper interpen20
etration of federal and state authority.'
The argument made in support of that abandonment does not
easily apply to the separation of powers among the three named
heads of American national government. This argument is that the
states are represented in the national political process and therefore
the valid interests of state governments, and of their citizens, are
likely to be protected in the making of federal policy.1 2' Imperfect
114

See Rapaczynski, supra note 16.
See, in particular, Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935),
decided the same day as A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495
(1935)-perhaps the New Deal's blackest day. Humnphrey's Executor has never been questioned by the Court, and its formalist analysis remains influential today, as its frequent
citation in Bowsher amply testifies.
116
See Rapaczynski, supra note 16.
117 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
118
See Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 287-95
(1981).
119 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
120
A different way of looking at the User' cases is to remark that only one justiceJustice Blackmun-changed his mind in Garcia, among ample threats by the new minority that when the occasion arose they would return the compliment. I will refrain from
treating the correctness of these cases or alternative approaches. For that discussion I
refer the reader to my colleague Andrzej Rapaczynski's interesting analysis, supra note
16. The point here is simply to illustrate the third approach possible, in addition to
those of Bowsher and Schor.
121
See Wechsler, The PoliticalSafeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REv. 543, 546 (1954) ("[T]he
existence of the states as governmental entities and as the sources of the standing law is
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as this political mechanism may be in the context of federalism, 12 2 it
is deeply problematic in assessing relations among President, Congress, and Court. First, equivalent "political process" reformulations are not possible; more important, the judiciary's participation
in separation-of-powers controversies may be found precisely in its
authority to assess the legality of actions respecting congressional,
presidential, or judicial powers.' 2 3 Judicial renunciation of that authority would, in itself, work a startling and deep shift in the distribution of authority within American government. Nonetheless, the
"political process" argument has been made;' 24 its success in Garcia
suggests it might be heard; and the prospect of that result as a reaction to the undoubted difficulties ofjudicial management of a functional inquiry warrants attention.
Simply looking at the cases, an observer might conclude that
the Court seems much more clearly committed to functionalism in
examining its own place in the constitutional scheme than in dealing
with issues concerning the other two heads of federal government.
Only once since the decision in Crowell v. Benson, 125 in the plurality
opinion of fourJustices in Northern Pipeline, has the Court come close
to voicing a formalistic view of separation-of-powers issues concerning the courts. Indeed, as we have seen, the number ofJustices who
remain faithful to that approach is now reduced from four to two.
This shift could reflect an appreciation of the extraordinary complexity of the federal judicial system,' 2 6 embracing not only those
congressional creations that are unmistakably courts or adjuncts to
them, but also the regulatory bodies, attached to or "independent"
of the presidency, that have been congressionally endowed with dispute-resolving power. It may reflect an appropriate modesty in declaring constitutional principles that might appear to enshrine the
Court's own place, 12 7 or it may reflect self-interested relief at being
freed of the need to decide matters of routine in litigation-rich
times. 128 Whichever explanation one believes, the Court has unmistakably chosen a functional approach over a formal approach in asin itself the prime determinant of our working federalism, coloring the nature and the
scope of our national legislative processes from their inception.").
122 Kaden, Politics, Money, and State Sovereignty: The Judicial Role, 79 CoLurM. L. REV.

847 (1979); Rapaczynski, supra note 16.
123 Monaghan, Book Review, 94 HARV. L. REV. 296, 303, 307 (1980) (For example,
"Congress is not institutionally 'represented' in the White House." (reviewing J.
CHOPER, supra note 15)).

124
125
126
127
128
notes

J. CHOPER, supra note 15, at 260-379.
285 U.S. 22 (1932); see supra notes 71-73 and accompanying text.
E.g., Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530 (1962).
Cf. Hart, supra note 113.
The government clearly drew on this attitude in its argument of Schor. See supra
78 & 89.
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sessing questions of impact on its own functions. In matters
affecting Congress and the President, on the other hand, the record
is equivocal, and the recent trend to formalism appears to be gathering momentum.
That judges have greater personal experience both of the complexity of the "judicial" function and of the arguable advantages of
recognizing the conveniences of administrative judging cannot form
a principled basis on which to differentiate separation-of-powers
disputes involving the courts from separation-of-powers disputes involving the President and Congress. Simply because judges recognize that separation-of-powers issues prove extraordinarily complex
in the judicial settings with which they are familiar hardly establishes
that the issues are simple in circumstances they can less readily understand. Similarly, just because judges can personally appreciate
the convenience of delegating routine judicial functions to others
fails to differentiate these matters from other settings where the
judges tell us, " 'the fact that a given law or procedure is efficient,
convenient, and useful in facilitating functions of government,
standing alone, will not save it if it is contrary to the Constitution.
Convenience and efficiency are not the primary objectives-or the
hallmarks-of democratic government.' "129 Certainly, nothing in
Crowell or any of its progeny suggests that some special quality of the
position of the courts renders functionalism unmistakably appropriate for them, while less relevant to the other named heads of government. The tenor of Crowell's language is to just the opposite
effect. "[R]egard must be had, as in other cases where constitutionallimits
are invoked, not to mere matters of form but to the substance of what
is required."' 30
The possibility that the Court is acting out of "modesty,"
choosing a relatively permissive and flexible test vis-a'-vis judicial
functioning to avoid the appearance of self-serving statement, has at
least two aspects. First, the choice between formalist and functionalist approaches might be seen as essentially tactical: formal approaches to presidential/congressional disputes will both simplify
planning for those two politically potent bodies (albeit at some cost
to government flexibility) and diminish their sense that the judges
personally, as distinct from the law, are responsible for the outcome.131 This approach thus encourages acceptance and discourages retaliation. Functional approaches to matters involving the
129

Bowsher, 106 S. Ct. at 3193-94 (quoting INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 944

(1983)).
130 285 U.S. at 53 (emphasis added).
131 Formal rules give the appearance of being exogenous: "It isn't that I wanted to
do this, but I had no choice."
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judiciary acknowledge its position as "the least powerful branch";
their consistent tendency is to validate legislative choices, avoiding
3 2
confrontation.'
Second, as Justice O'Connor's effort to distinguish Bowsher in
Schor also suggests, the choice may be a function of the need for
effective containment, an approach that would tend to treat a constitutional actor's "aggrandizement" of its own function and its "undermining" or restriction of another's function as separable issues.
When the issue is whether one of the named heads of governmental
authority can appropriate to itself some function it did not previously enjoy, the question of containing that head within its designated role is presented more sharply than when the issue involves
taking from one of the actors or reducing the extent of some function previously enjoyed. 13 3 One could make a formalistic, tripartite
division analysis of additions to an actor's functions, and a functional
analysis of subtractions from an actor's authority or-perhaps especially-one actor's apparent relinquishment (as by delegation) of
some piece of its own ordinary authority to another.
The tactical explanation is hard to connect with the constitutional scheme, as distinct from some critical sense of realpolitik.
That is, such a judicial response may reflect the behavior political
observers would expect from a relatively weak institution, as it
struggles to maintain its position and influence relative to its competitors. But nothing in the Constitution or in the objective circumstances of judicial review suggests this outcome. One thinking
about American government in the usual way, as consisting of three
"branches" that encompass all of government's operating units,
might also find the "aggrandizement" explanation problematic. On
the three-branch hypothesis, one cannot subtract here without adding there. If the judicial function is diminished by assigning adjudicatory functions to "the executive branch," that also enlarges the
presidency, suggesting presence there of the merged functions
against which, on the formalist hypothesis, the Constitution
guards-whatever the apparent gains in convenience.
Yet "addition" and "subtraction" need not be taken as the opposite sides of one coin. The formation of an ordinary administrative agency, 134 in particular, can be seen as "subtracting" from what
132
Cf. C. BLAcK,THE PEOPLE AND THE COURT 52 (1960) ("[A] case can be made for
believing that the prime and most necessary function of the Court has been that of
validation .... ).
1
The Court has characterized the containment problem as one "hydraulic pressure" threatening to break down the scheme of separated powers and merge them in
one place. Bouuher, 106 S. Ct. at 3189 (quoting Chadha, 462 U.S. at 951).
134 By "'administrative agency" I do ?w mean "independent regulatory conmnission." .1/1 bodies responsible for regulation are included. The following analysis is as
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would otherwise be the authority of each of the three constitutional
actors: Congress's delegation loosens its controls over the formulation of legislative policy; the agency's law-enforcement functions detract to some degree from what would otherwise be the President's
personal executive function; and the agency's decisional process can
significantly displace that of the courts. To which actor's authority
does all of this subtracting add? At this point, the analysis summarized above' 3 5 acquires particular bite: there is no constitutional
need to regard the functioning, day-to-day elements of government
(that is, the agencies) as being "in" any particular "branch" (as distinct from having a relationship with the named constitutional actors). In such a case, the functional question would remainnamely, has so much been taken from the functioning of Actor X to
impair its core function?-but the formal analysis would be irrelevant. The general question of control, of assuring the lawfulness
and responsiveness of government, remains; yet so long as conventional lines of control running to each of the named heads of government are present-so long as Congress can revise the statute and
must appropriate needed resources, the President may appoint and
consult, the courts may review-the issue of aggrandizement simply
disappears.
Schor is precisely such a case. The CFTC, an "independent"
agency, wields some powers of each of the three named heads of
government. Thus, in Schor, it had adopted a rule which, if valid,
enjoyed the force of a statute: it authorized the exercise of ajurisdiction over counterclaims in Commission adjudication for which there
would otherwise have been no basis. The CFTC daily takes and implements decisions about the enforcement of commodity futures
regulatory law, seeking information, announcing policies, initiating
proceedings, and ordering priorities. And as this case makes evident, the Commission also-to a degree greater than most136-entertains and decides disputes, resolving the legal claims of
individuals that would otherwise be grist for the courts. Yet the
Commission also enjoys a strong relationship with each of the constitutional actors it has thus, to some extent, displaced. It acts
valid for the Department of Agriculture as it is for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Although one is conventionally described as being "in" "the executive branch" and the
other not, it is obvious that both must be (and are) described as "executive" for some
constitutional purposes. Each has legal authority to make judgments which the President is not entitled to displace or overrule-that is, which are beyond his lawful command. That distinctions exist between them-for example, in the degree of control the
President enjoys over the tenure of the chief officers of each-may speak to the nature of
necessary presidential controls but does not detract from the broad picture painted in
the text. See supra notes 17-24 and accompanying text.
1:5 J.
13;

See supra note 78.
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within the framework of congressional statutes, under the constraints of congressional appropriations, and subject to the ordinary
routine of congressional oversight and political chaffering. The
President appoints its members, who doubtless respond to his requests for advice or suggestions as to national policy, cooperate in
his councils, depend upon him for logistic support, and suffer his
13 7
discipline when they depart from their duty.
Most important, given the particular dispute in Schor, the
CFTC's decisions are subject to judicial controls in the usual fashion: factual judgments are upheld only if supported by "substantial
evidence" on the administrative record viewed as a whole; legal
judgments are upheld only if supported by the court's independent
inquiry (although that inquiry may identify reasons why the court is
to accept some reasonable agency judgments); 3 8 and matters left to
agency discretion must still be explained and rationalized to a degree that prevents a court from concluding that its exercise was "arbitrary" or "capricious." Given these arrangements, one can easily
conclude that courts have been assured all the essentials ofjudicial
power, in circumstances that do not threaten "separation-of-powers" policy; one cannot see how either the President or Congress
has been enlarged vis-At-vis the courts, or made more threatening in
relation to them, or how the courts' capacity to maintain their relationship with the political heads of government has been diminished. Only formalism supports a negative judgment.
As has already been suggested, the problem underlying Bowsher
cannot be understood in the same way. It is not simply that Congress chose a particular mechanism for protecting the "independence" and "objectivity" of the Comptroller General-a mechanism
that, in the abstract, one might think would work effectively toward
that end. The Comptroller General's relationships with the President, from the proposing of his appointment onward, are strikingly
weaker than those that characterize other agencies; the President
and the courts both are utterly divorced from participating in the
control of the particular functions under review; and the relationship between Congress and the Comptroller General is far more
embracive and proprietary than the relationships that characterize
the rest of government. Here one could fairly describe Congress as
137

The data for some of these propositions as empirical statements about the CFTC

in particular is not at hand; yet one cannot imagine a current and effective part of American government for which they would not be true. The reference to discipline is, simply.
a reminder that the President is authorized to remove Commissioners "for cause"-an
authority that looms even larger in the wake of the majority's potentially generous construction of that power in Bousher.
I :8
See I.evin, Scope of Review Docrine Restated: An Adninislrathe Law Section Reporl. 8
ADIN. L. REv. 239 (1986); supra note 89.
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having appropriated to itself the President's characteristic functions
(and made nugatory those of the courts). Functionalist and formalist
could be equally concerned with these outcomes; that the Court
chose a formalist analysis speaks to possible rhetorical advantages,
but not to outcome.
Viewing "aggrandizement" in terms of the full set of relationships among agency, Congress, President, and courts rather than in
terms of a single "talismanic" feature of one of those relationships
is, of course, precisely what the Bowsher Court failed to do. In this
sense Justice White has the better of the argument; the factual assertions that the majority chose to make about congressional dominion
over the Comptroller General were unsustainable. Yet in the end
Justice White fares no better. While he insists on functionalism
rather than formalism, he fails (as he had in the earlier cases) to
carry through with an inquiry addressed to the whole range of circumstances informing functional analysis. In Bowsher he looks only at
the discharge provisions and not, as a functional analysis should insist, at how they sit in the general framework of relationships among
the GAO, Congress, President, and courts. If the right question is
whether the arrangements under challenge threaten to aggrandize
one of the three named constitutional actors at the expense of another, thus imperiling the balance of American government and the
performance of core functions by the weakened actor, then that
question requires a broader view.
Note that the question asks nothing directly about the agency
empowered to act-the GAO or the CFTC-but rather asks about
the impact of the challenged arrangements on the three named
heads of constitutional government and the relationships among
them. Although one can easily agree with the Schor majority that
empowering the CFTC to entertain counterclaims under state common law entails no such consequences, the equation in Bowsher is
not as clear. In Bowsher, aggrandizement is present: what the President loses in the way of ordinary controls over the tenure of government officials, Congress has asserted for itself. The "standard
relationship of control," preserved between court and agency in
Schor, is missing between President and agency in Bowsher. The legislative histories of both enactments in question, the tenure provision of the 1921 Act and the 1985 deficit reduction measure, reflect
specific attention to the distribution of power between President
and Congress, the intention to reduce it there and increase it here.
The 1985 legislation excludes even the judiciary from participation
in control over the important governmental functions being exercised. It is not that convenience or factual impact is never relevant
to separation-of-powers inquiry, but that, in these circumstances, the
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historical insignificance of the particular challenged control, over
the years, could be judged insufficient to answer the institutional
threat. Congress could be excused much in its own relationship
with the GAO if it recognized conventional presidential and judicial
relationships with that agency. Its insistence on an exclusive relationship, a device which if successful could indeed propel Congress
into a general position of dominance over the national government,
is the differentiating feature, and the one that renders Justice
White's result (if not his general mode of analysis) suspect.' 39
139

In an interesting analysis, Charles Tiefer defended other GAO authority that

could be characterized as "executive," along with the authority of special prosecutors
appointed under the Ethics in Government Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 591-598 (1982 & Supp. III
1985), and of inspectors general acting under the Inspector General Act of 1978, 5
U.S.C. §§ 1-I I (Supp. III 1985), on what might be called a conflict of interest theory.
Tiefer, The Constitutionality of Independent Officers as Checks on Abuses of Executive Power, 63
B.U.L. REV. 59 (1983). He proposes that agencies independent of presidential direction
are justified when their independence permits them to serve a checking function against
presidential self-dealing. Examples might include a special prosecutor able to act
against wrongdoing high in the administration (against which a President might be
tempted to suppress investigation); an inspector general able to give Congress accounts
of departmental waste and fraud unaffected by the Secretary's wishes to preserve the
appearance of rectitude; a Comptroller General able to enlist the compulsion of a judicial order in inspecting the records of recalcitrant agencies, 31 U.S.C. § 716(c)(1)
(1982), or to sue to block a wrongful executive impoundment, 2 U.S.C. §§ 686-687
(1982).
Quis custodies custodiet? is indeed the central dilemma of separation-of-powers theory,
and the suggested approach may prove a fruitful one. Interbranch checking of this character has less obvious consequences for citizen control of government, and a greater
likelihood of contributing to flexibility in government arrangements, than the displacement of one or another "main actor" in matters having a direct impact outside government. See Strauss, Legislative Ieto, supra note 17, at 805-17.
A sequel to Bow'sher, decided by the Third Circuit as this essay went to press, appears on initial reading to be consistent with Professor Tiefer's approach. Ameron, Inc.
v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 809 F.2d 979 (3d Cir. 1986). At issue in that
case was the Competition in Contracting Act, 31 U.S.C. §§ 3551-3556 (Supp. III 1985),
a congressional effort, again involving the use of the GAO, to find a means for checking
departmental adherence to the norms of government contracting procedures without
invoking time-consuming judicial procedures or having to leave the department to
watch itself. Under the challenged provisions of this statute, the filing of a protest by a
disappointed bidder stays the awarding of a challenged contract until the Comptroller
General responds to the protest or the agency certifies that "urgent and compelling
circumstances" require it to go forward. Id. § 3553. The Comptroller General's ultimate ruling, to be made within a brief time, is in the form of a recommendation to the
agency, and the stay is then lifted; the agency may adopt the recommendation or not, as
it chooses. Only the partial dependence of the stay on the Comptroller General's action
was challenged as inconsistent with separation of powers.
The court accepted that the Comptroller General was to be regarded, under Bowsher, as a congressional agent, 809 F.2d at 982; it nonetheless sustained the statute. The
administration of government contracts and the expenditure of government funds both
involve ctivitics in which Congress and the President share intense interests. Where
the Comptroller General's decision in Bow'sher binds the President (and, in a sense. the
rest of us), in .. nieron the filing of a protest generates an automatic, time-limitcd stay,
albeit one whose duration depends in part on the time it takes for the Comptroller General to voice his recommendation. Since he is given no merits-determining power, the
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The suggestion made here, that courts should view separationof-powers cases in terms of the impact of challenged arrangements
on the balance of power among the three named heads of American
government, gives rise to at least three cautionary questions, none
of which seems possible to resolve in this essay. First, is such analysis judicially manageable in the individual case? Second, is the analysis capable of keeping us within range of the constitutional text
over time? And third, does the analysis sufficiently express the important judgments of that text?
The first question, reflected injustice Brennan's assertion in his
Schor dissent that such analysis would inevitably fail (because of the
immediacy of convenience gains, and the distance and ineffability of
core function losses),1 40 is a variant of the general critique of judicial balancing. One needs to distinguish here between the proposition that some judges will balance poorly, as in my view Justice
White did in Bowsher, and the proposition that balancing as such is
either inherently unmanageable, or presents such endemic risks of
poor performance that it is generally undesirable. The questions
are serious ones; it is not hard to say what the central issues are, but
determining when the institutional capacities necessary to maintain
the required tension among Congress, President, and Court have
been threatened will rarely be other than a difficult act of judgment.141 Yet all Justices-including Justice Brennan-continue to
find the use of such techniques appropriate and sustainable in settings where, as here, underlying policy is evoked more easily than
textual specification.
There remains the chance, also identified by Justice Brennan's
Schor dissent, 142 that the repetitive making of "reasonable" choices
by Congress will, over time, erode the independence of the judiciary
or of the President. The argument is that a series of small steps,
each reasonable within its context, provides a means by which Congress may subordinate either or both of these actors. The changes
litigation growth has been working in the judiciary's capacity to
function, and the resulting spate of proposals to consign new areas
court easily placed the scheme in the realm of oversight, rather than control. Any affect
on outside parties is limited to delay (unless the agency itself is moved to reconsider on
receiving the Comptroller General's advice-and no one claims a constitutional ill in
that), and from an ex ante perspective the risk of delay is far less than if (as it plainly
could) Congress put the same stay device and dispute-resolving authority in the courts.
In the Ameron context, as not in Bowsher, it is possible to see the challenged device as an
instrument of ongoing, self-informing discussion and adjustment between the President
and Congress, rather than as one of command.
140
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to administrative rather than judicial provenance, 43 give point to
Justice Brennan's fears for the judiciary. Yet American constitutional review has always been more effective in preventing large and
sudden departures from contemporary understandings than in
avoiding what Justice Brennan fears as slow erosion; its adaptability
to slow change-the genius of the common law, it might be calledhas been a strength, not a weakness, one that has permitted the
Constitution to endure. A swamped judiciary, in which even the
Supreme Court's capacity for oversight is impaired by enormous
growth in the overseeable base, will be no more effective a protector
of our liberties than a diminished judiciary. Assume such changes as
Justice Brennan fears might occur over the decades (as administrative government has grown over the decades); still we do not know
what other changes might occur during the same period, arguably
neutralizing those effects.
Finally, maintaining an appropriate balance among the three
named constitutional actors may not prove sufficient to preserve the
values of the constitutional scheme. In addition to the problem of
aggrandizement, of imbalance, there is also the problem of remoteness, of unaccountability. This problem could be viewed from the
perspective either of politics or of law. That is, the authority of
agencies such as the CFTC may be objected to on the ground that
that they are too remote from electorial accountability, the chief
control that we as citizens enjoy over Congress and President. A
different objection is that agencies are insufficiently subject to the
constraints of law, and to the limitation that the need for public acceptance imposes on the courts.
The problem of political accountability has loomed large in recent literature,' 44 but does not yield readily to simple distinctions
between "attached" and "independent" agencies. In Chevron,
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,145 a recent decision
directly concerned with problems of scope of review, all of the Justices joined Justice Stevens' statement recognizing both the importance and the fact of political accountability through the President:
"While agencies are not directly accountable to the people, the
Chief Executive is, and it is entirely appropriate for this political
branch of the Government to make . . . policy choices."' 146 The
See supra note 78.
See, e.g., Mashaw, Prodelegation: Ilhy Administratos Should Make PoliticalDecisions. I
J.L. ECON. & ORG. 81 (1985); Stewart, The Discontents of Legalism: Interest Group Relations in
Administrative Regulation, 1985 Wis. L. REv.655; Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public
Law. 38 STAN. L. REV. 29 (1985); cf. Cass, Allocation ofAuthority T'ithin Bureaucracies: Empirical Evidence atd Nortative .Analysis, 66 B.U.L. REV. 1 (1986).
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agency subject of Chevron, the EPA, is one "attached" to-rather
than "independent" of-the presidency in formal terms; yet once
one gets past the simplistic belief that the existence of a "for cause"
removal restriction fully determines an agency's accountability to
the President, one can understand that Justice Stevens' statement
concedes (as is indisputable) that even attached agencies are somewhat independent of the President. In the same way, independent
agencies are often significantly attached, as, inter alia, the Court's
stress in Bowsher on the undefined and broad character of "for
cause" removal authority emphasizes. The issue is one of degree,
and the thickness of the President's connections to most if not all
current agencies, independent or attached, makes both Justice Stevens' observation and the questions currently being raised in the
literature applicable to all.
The question of judicial accountability may be more pressing.
Since Congress generally provides rather full review of administrative action-one imagines, wishing the resultant control rather than
seeking to avoid possible constitutional difficulty as such-the question what would be a sufficient judicial relationship does not often
arise, at least outside the framework of "adjunct" relationships as in
Crowell. It did rear its head, however, in Thomas v. Union CarbideAgricultural Products Co., 147 in which Justice O'Connor's opinion for the
Court seems to suggest a narrow view. Recall her conclusion that
review limited to determining whether an arbitrator had abused or
exceeded his power, "willfully" misconstrued his mandate, or committed "constitutional error" would suffice to meet "whatever judicial review might be required by due process."' 148 Although a party
stipulation abandoning any due process claims removed any concern over the definition of this "due process review" from the case,
it is apparent that the constitutional minimum injustice O'Connor's
sights describes a level ofjudicial involvement considerably reduced
from the usual court-agency relationship.
If the issue is seen only from the perspective whether the subtraction from judicial authority threatens the courts' capacity to perform their function in the constitutional scheme or authorizes
presidential or congressional encroachment on judicial function,
then the Thomas Court's judgment that no such threat exists is readily accepted. Seen from the perspective of remoteness, howeverthe quality of the agency's connections to the constraints of lawthe notion that it might suffice to provide review only for fraud, misrepresentation, or constitutional error is disturbing. Again, the posture of Thomas, including the largely consensual nature of the
147
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arbitral submission and the special characteristics ordinarily attached to arbitrators, suggests that these expressions are not a reliable indicator of the Court's future direction. The Court remanded,
rather than decide, a delegation issue that might be thought particularly apt for consideration of the remoteness issue (since the absence of control is at the heart of the delegation problem), and
Justice Brennan's concurrence for three members of the Court asserted that the review function that Justice O'Connor identifies
"preserves the judicial authority over questions of law in the present
context." 149 "So long as this delegation is constitutionally permissible-an issue left open on remand-and judicial review to ensure
that the arbitrator's exercise of authority in any given case does not
depart from the mandate of the delegation, the judiciary will exercise a restraining authority sufficient to meet whatever requirements
Article III might impose in the present context."' 50 Yet delegation
arguments are desperation arguments in the current legal climate,
and Justice Brennan's hopeful reading of what judicial review is required seems just that, particularly given the loss of support for his
position in Schor.
If the facts in Schor were precisely as given, except that Congress had made the CFTC's judgment reviewable only for fraud,
misrepresentation, similar misconduct, or constitutional error,
should the majority have reached the same result? Review for constitutional error suffices to check Congress but, as the courts have
readily affirmed in the context of statutory exclusion of review of
decisions made by the Veteran's Administration, 5 1 this cannot be
converted into a check on the legality of agency action without repudiating the congressional limitation of review. The Court also may
constrain the President; indeed, the CFTC's independence underscores the absence of any threat of presidential aggrandizement
through such a provision. But again, this observation suggests no
measure of control over what the agency does; if anything, it suggests
a need for greater judicial control than would be experienced for an
agency more firmly attached to the President. These hypothesized
arrangements present no threat to judicial function greater than
that to congressional or executive function. One's sense that the
arrangements nonetheless present a substantial threat to the premises of control and constraint on which our governmental arrange149

Id. at 601 (Brennan, J., concurring).

150

Id. at 602.

151 Walters v. National Ass'n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305 (1985); Johnson
v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361 (1974). These were the two cases cited by the Thomas court for
its proposition concerning constitutional review. See also Judge (now Justice) Scalia's
opinion for the D.C. Circuit in Gott v. Walters, 756 F.2d 902, 906-16, vacated on joint
motion of the parties, 791 F.2d 172 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (en banc).
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ments rest suggests issues the future may have to address. What
intensity of judicial review is necessary to maintain the connection
between agency action and the premises of containment of government function underlying the separation-of-powers idea, is an issue
quite separate from that of aggrandizement (since it need not be the
President or Congress that gains power in this way), to which significant new attention must be addressed.
That worthy project is a larger one than seemed possible to undertake for this symposium. For the moment, it is sufficient to note
that the Court appears to be at sixes and sevens about the appropriate analytic technology for resolving separation-of-powers issues.
Although formalism has its advantages and functionalism its dangers, the former is simply incapable of describing the government
we have. It is inconsistent with the framers' judgment-as embodied in the necessary and proper clause and in the decision to omit
any description of government proper from the constitutional textthat the optimal level of specificity about the forms of government is
low. 152 At best formalism serves as proxy for a functional approach
for Justices perhaps unwilling to trust their inheritors-or even
themselves-with the difficult and contextual analyses that functionalism requires.
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